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Summary findings
Ezemenari  and  Subbarao  examine  how  the  food  stamp  more  than  households  without,  in terms  of the  poverty
program  affected  measures  of poverty  during  devaluation  headcount  and  gap.
of the Jamaican  dollar  in the early  1990s.  The  program  also appears  to have had  more  effect  on
They  find  that  without  the food  stamp  prograrm,  the  extremely  poor  households  than  on  those  of the transient
poverty  gap in Jamaica  would  have  been much  worse,  poor  (people  who  move  in and  out  of poverty).
especially  in 1990  and  1991.  Explicitly  incorporating  behavioral  responses  into  the
For  the  country  as a whole,  not  having  a food  stamp  model  reduces  the  contribution  of food  stamps  to
program  wouldn't  have  affected  the  incidence  of poverty  household  consumption  and poverty,  but  the  poorest
significantly,  but  particular  groups  among  the poor  benefited  most  from  the program  even after  accounting
would  have fared  worse.  for  behavioral  responses.  The  program  contributed  more
Households  with  elderly  residents  benefited  nmost  from  to reducing  poverty  than  to smoothing  consumption.
the  program.  Households  with  young  children  benefited
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1  Introduction
Over  the  last  two  decades,  the  proliferation  of  macro-economic  adjustment  and
stabilization programs has given rise to a concem with the associated social costs, and an
interest in the role of safety nets for the poor during the process of economic reform.
However, few countries have been able to introduce safety nets during economic reform;
and among these countries, few have had available the datasets to facilitate an evaluation
of the role of the safety net in cushioning adverse short-run outcomes of adjustment on
the  poor.  Jamaica  is  one  of  the  countries  which  does  have  available  nationally
representative datasets (some in panel form) that cover such programs as the Poor Relief
and Public Assistance, the School Feeding Program and the Food Stamp Progran  -all
operating alongside the economic reform program.  This paper will focus on the most
important of them all: the Food Stamp Program (FSP).
There have been few impact evaluations of the Jamaican FSP.  Studies to  date have
focused on access and targeting efficiency, but only rarely on the consumption effects or
poverty impacts. For example, Grosh (1992) gives an overview of the FSP in terms of
administration and operations, participation and targeting efficiency.  Grosh (1992) finds
that the FSP was better targeted than the previous general food subsidy program: 57
percent of FSP benefits accrued to the poorest 40 percent of the population in 1988, while
6 percent of FSP transfers accrued to the wealthiest quintile. This contrasts with the food
subsidy program which resulted in 34 percent of the food price subsidy accruing to thepoorest 40 percent of population.  The use of public health centers as distribution centers
for food stamps was found to be central for FSP's better targeting outcomes.
However, despite these targeting outcomes, it is not clear how effective the level of the
benefit has been in reducing poverty. The existence of comprehensive panel datasets on
the living conditions of Jamaican households during a period of economic reform and
FSP experiment, provides an opportunity for an evaluation of the poverty impact of the
FSP.  This study is an attempt in this direction.
The paper  begins  with  a  brief overview of  the  economic trends  leading up  to  the
devaluation of the Jamaican dollar in the early 1990s, followed by a description of the
Jamaican food stamp program.  The next section outlines the methodology; and final
sections present some empirical results and conclusion.
2  The Policy Context
Jamaica's  policy reform efforts span over fifteen years and has yielded mixed results.
The oil shocks of the early 1970s coupled with the decline in prices of bauxite-the
major export crop-resulted  in a decline in real GDP and labor income between 1973 and
1980.  In  order to  minimize the  adverse consequences of  a  decline in  income, the
government increased public expenditures on social services, expanded employment in
the public sector, increased the money supply and real wages.  As a result, government
expenditure as a percent of GDP increased from 25 percent in 1972 to 46 percent in 1976
and the fiscal deficit increased from  5 percent to 24 percent of  GDP.  By  1977, the
governnent allowed real wages to decline and turned to subsidies to mitigate the adverse
effects of reform.  The share of subsidies in national disposable income increased from 2
2percent to 6 percent between  1976 and 1977. By 1980, the fiscal deficit as a percent of
GDP was 18 percent.
In  1981, the government concluded a stand-by agreement with the IMF.  The objective
was to reduce the role of the public sector and promote private sector economic activity
with  an  export-oriented focus. The  agreement provided for  a  large  devaluation and
restrictions on  government expenditure.  In  1984 the government implemented strict
fiscal austerity programs and cut public employment, labor costs, and social services.
Minimum wages fell by 11.8 percent from September 1983 to July 1985.
Further progress was made during the late 1980s in trade liberalization and public sector
restructuring.  Fifty  of the 330 public entities were phased out, thus reducing public
sector employment. Price controls and subsidies were removed, and minimum farm-gate
prices for key export crops  were introduced. Interest subsidies in the agricultural sector
were abolished. Generalized food subsidies were replaced by a targeted food assistance to
the poor.  Although the gradual opening up of the economy had some impact on growth
(during the period 1986-90 the economy grew at 5 percent per year), fiscal and monetary
policies  continued  to  be  expansive, fueling inflation.  The exchange rate  was  fully
liberalized in October 1991, which was followed by  a substantial devaluation of the
Jamaican dollar. During 1989-92,  the incidence of poverty increased (Table 1).
3Table 1: Incidence of Poverty and Food Stamps in Jamaica
November  November  November  November
1989a  1990  1991  1992
Percent Poor  26.9  27.9  38.9  34.2
Poverty Gap  8.8  7.9  13.7  10.6
Poverty Severity  3.9  2.9  6.6  4.4
Percent Households Receiving Food Stamps
Poorest Quintile  33.7  29.3  42.6  45.0
2  26  20.4  27.6  36.6
3  17  14.2  20.3  27.1
4  8.7  9.2  11.7  16.3
Top Quintile  4.0  2.7  4.0  6.1
Jamaica  14.9  12.8  17.8  20.0
a  Quintile  data for 1989  refers  to the month  of July of the Jamaican  Survey of Living  Conditions.
Source:  Jamaica:  A Strategy  for Growth  and  Poverty  Reduction  Country  Economic  Memorandum,
1994, World  Bank;  and Jamaica  Survey  of Living  Conditions  Report  1992,  The Planning
Institute  of Jamaica  and  The Statistical  Institute  of Jamaica.
3  The Jamaican Food Stamp Program (FSP) 2
In  order  to  mitigate  the  adverse short-run  impacts of  macro-economic stabilization
measures on the poor, the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) implemented the FSP in 19843.
The  food  stamp  program  was  targeted  to  two  main  categories  of  people  who  were
considered at nutritional risk: (i) pregnant and lactating women and children under 5
years of age; and (ii) the poor, elderly and handicapped. The continuing devaluation of
the  Jamaican  dollar  coupled with  inflation prompted GOJ to  expand the  eligibility
category in September 1990, to  include poor single member households with  incomes
below J$3,000 per annum and families with two or more members with an income below
J$7,200.
2 This  section  is based  on Grosh  (1992)  which  provides  a detailed  description  of the operation  of the
programn.  See also  Andersen  (1993).
3  In addition,  a school  feeding  program  was  also introduced.
4Institutional Structure of the FSP.  The FSP is administered through various government
ministries.  The  Ministry  of  Labor,  Welfare  and  Sport  is  responsible  for  overall
administration, means testing, registration of participants, distribution of stamps, etc.  The
Ministry  of  Health  facilitates  the  registration  and  distribution  of  stamps  to
pregnant/lactating women and children under 5.  The Ministry of Local Government,
through its Poor Relief Officers, facilitate the enrollment of beneficiaries.  The Ministry
of  Finance and  the Planning Institute coordinate the role of  the program in  overall
government budgeting.  Finally, the Jamaican Commodity Trading Company monetizes
the food donations which partially support the program.
Commodity Coverage. Food stamps are good towards the purchase of cornmeal, rice and
powdered skimmed milk.  However, stamps are actually traded for a wider range of
goods, although generally most of these are staple goods.  Food stamps are legal tender
and are accepted at commercial grocery outlets.  Retailers use collected stamps as part of
their payments to their wholesalers. The stamps can be used by retailers to purchase any
commodity from wholesalers (including those not covered by the program). This greatly
simplifies the reclamation system and increases the willingness of the distribution chain
to participate.  Wholesalers redeem the stamps at their banks.  The Central Bank then
turns the stamps over to the Ministry of Labor, Welfare and Sport where they are used to
reconcile records, are stored for six months and then burned.
Eligibility  and  Access.  Children  under  5,  pregnant,  and  lactating  women  are
automatically eligible.  Members of each group register at clinics.  Pregnant women are
kept on the rolls until their expected delivery dates, at which time they must re-register as
5lactating mothers.  No proof of lactation is necessary.  Women are eligible for food
stamps six months after the birth of a child.
All Poor Relief and Public Assistance recipients, as well as indigent households with
income less than J$2,600 are automatically eligible for food stamps.  A simple means test
is used to determine eligibility. Poor Relief Officers and community members may name
candidates for food stamps in the elderly, handicapped, and indigent category.  Once a
nomination has  been made, the Poor Relief  Officer makes a home visit  to  confirm
eligibility.  Based on the Officer's observation of the home, a recommendation is made
either for or against the candidate, (the Officer cannot stop the application on his own
authority).
Food stamp recipients pick up their food stamps in person on a pre-specified day, once
every two months.  Proxy forms, which are filled out in Poor Relief offices in advance,
give the right to  a proxy to  pick up the  stamps either on  a  specified date  or on  a
continuing basis. Pregnant and lactating women, and mothers of children under 5 pick up
their stamps at clinics at which they are registered.  The elderly, handicapped or indigent
category of beneficiaries pick up their  stamps at the Poor Relief office or some pre-
specified civic site -i.e. post office, town hall, police station.  However, problems with
crowd control and aggression at some distribution sites may have increased the cost of
access to this latter group 0of  beneficiaries.
6Table 2:  Coverage of the Food Stamp Program by Eligibility Category
(Percent)
Category  1989  1990  1991  1992
Households  with children  <5 years  20  16.6  26.2  27.3
Households  with  pregnant  and
lactating  mothers  n.a.  0.5  7.2  2.5
Households  with elderly  18.6  22.3  30.1  42.7
Source: Jamaica  Survey  of Living  Conditions  Report,  various  years  -November 1989,  1990,  1991,  1992.
Planning  Institute  of Jamaica.
Table 3:  Percentage of Households in Poorest and Richest Quintiles Receiving
Food Stamp Transfers by Eligibility Category
1989  1990  1991
Category  Poorest  Richest  Poorest  Richest  Poorest  Richest
Quintile  Quintile  Quintile  Quintile  Quintile  Quintile
Households  with children  34.6  5.3
<5 years
Households  with elderly  38.5  5.5
All Households  31.2  2.2  12.9  1.4  38.3  2.2
Source: Jamaica  Survey  of Living  Conditions,  November  1989,  1990,  1991.
In 1993, total costs of the program amounted to roughly 0.1  1 percent of GDP. During the
period  1989-1992, the program reached between 12 and  20 percent  of all  Jamaican
households (Table 1).  During these same years, 30 to 40 percent of households in the
poorest  quintiles  gained  access to  food  stamps  compared with  3  to  6  percent  of
households in the highest quintiles.  These numbers illustrate the fact that the FSP has
excellent targeting outcomes (compared to similar programs in other countries).  With
regard to  access based on  gender, Louat, Grosh and Van der Gaag  (1993) found no
7difference in access between male and female children in male- versus female-headed
households.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize program access by eligibility criteria for select years. Coverage
and participation is consistently highest for households with preschoolers and the elderly.
We now turn to the main question we wish to address in this paper: what impact the
program had (if any) on the (incidence of poverty and the poverty gap for the various
categories of households.
3  Methodology
In order to determine the impact of FSP transfers on household welfare, the pre-FSP level
of consumption is first estimated. Thereafter, stochastic dominance tests between the pre-
FSP and post-FSP distributions of expenditure are computed to examine  whether or not
the  FSP was effective in  reducing poverty headcount and  gap.  Marginal stochastic
dominance tests are then used to determine in which years the FSP was most effective in
reducing poverty (for various groups). The specific methods are outlined below.
Estimation ofpre-transfer consumption. Household expenditures are used as the measure
of welfare.  In order to estimate the counterfactual (i.e., household expenditures in the
absence of FSP) the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of food stamp transfers
is employed to generate pre- and post-reform distributions.  The following equation is
used to estimate the marginal propensity to consume:
C = a + b FSP + c (household characteristics)  + error term  (1)
8The coefficient on FSP is the MPC out of food stamp expenditure (which is assumed to
be the same for all households). One issue in estimating the equation is the fact that food
stamp transfers are correlated with a variety of household characteristics.  In order to
arrive at unbiased estimates of the MPC, it is necessary to account for these household
characteristics in the regression.  We deal with this problem by including as regressors,
those characteristics of the household which are also criteria for receipt of FSP transfers.
In  addition,  we  exploit  the  availability  of  panel  data  by  estimating  a  model  of
consumption  in  which  household  fixed  effects  (or  any  other  potential  household
characteristics which  may  impact  on  the  level  of  the  FSP  transfer  and  household
consumption, but which does not vary over time) are eliminated by first  differencing.
Using the coefficient on FSP, the data on household expenditure (which represents post-
FSP expenditure) are adjusted to derive the expenditure in the absence of the FSP transfer
(i.e.,  the  counterfactual  situation).  After  generating  the  pre-  and  post-transfer
distributions  and  ordering both  according to  the  pre-transfer levels  of  expenditure,
stochastic dominance tests are performed.
Stochastic Dominance Analysis.  The concept of stochastic dominance is used to examine
the effect of food stamps on poverty during the process of policy reform. 4 Consider the
following distribution where P(z) is the probability distribution of household incomes
defined as follows:
z
Pa  f [I  - (x  /  z) ]a  f(x )  dx  (2)
0
4For detailed analysis of the application of stochastic dominance for poverty, see Ravallion (1992).
9where  z denotes the poverty line
x is household income
f(x) is the probability of observing a household with income x
and  oc  is a parameter.
The parameter a  is a measure of the policy maker's sensitivity to inequality among the
poor  (Ravallion  1992).  Varying  the  value  of  this  parameter  gives  rise  to  various
measures of the incidence of poverty.  For example, P0 = H(z) is the poverty headcount
index, and P1 = G(z) is the poverty gap index.  Let HF  be the headcount index when the
value of food stamps are included in household income, and HNF  be the headcount index
when food stamps are not included in household income.  Each household income, x is a
realization from a  random variable X.  Define two cumulative distribution functions,
F(x)=Pr(X = x) = HNF(z)  and W(x)=Pr(X = x) = HF(z) for the random variable X.  Then
by Theorem 1 of Forster-Greer-Thorbecke  (1984), the headcount index with food stamps,
will be less than that without food stamps, (i.e., HF(z) = HNF(z))  for all z if and only if,
F(x) = W(x) for all x with at least one inequality. This is first order dominance (FOD).
Similarly, for the  poverty gap,  Foster and  Shorrocks (1988)  show  that  there  is  a
correspondence between the orderings obtained from second order dominance (SOD) and
the poverty gap G(z) = Pl.
z  z
Define F1(x)= fF(t)  dt  and W1(x)= |W  (t) dt,  then GF(z)  = GNF(z)  for all z if and only if
0  0
FI(x) =  W,(x) with  at least one strict inequality.  In other words, if F1 second order
10dominates WI, then the poverty gap in F cannot exceed that of W regardless of the
poverty line chosen.
Figure  1 illustrates the concepts of FOD and SOD. In Figure 1, the poverty incidence
curve with the food stamp program (FSP) dominates the poverty incidence curve without
the FSP at all income levels close to and below the poverty line z: for any point estimate
around the poverty line z=k, the area under the poverty incidence curve without the FSP
is greater than the area under the incidence curve with the FSP.  In other words, the
cumulative proportion of the population with incomes below the poverty line is greater
without FSP transfers.  Thus, SOD follows.  Explicit testing for SOD would be required
if  the  poverty  incidence  curves  crossed  giving  rise  to  ambiguity  in  ranking  the
distributions.  In  this  instance,  a  comparison of  the  areas  underneath  the  poverty
incidence curves (the poverty gap curves) would be necessary.
Marginal  Stochastic Dominance Analysis.  To test the marginal contribution of food
stamps to poverty reduction, the matched pair test procedure outlined in Bishop, Chow,
and Formby (1994) and Bishop, Formby, and Zeager (1996) is used.  Define D(k) (the
value of the food stamp transfer) such that D(k) = F(k) - W(k), where k (=0, 0.25, 0.5
etc.) is  some fraction of the poverty line-i.e.  the value of  food stamp transfers for
households placed around the poverty line i.e. either lower, at, or higher than the poverty
line set at 1.  First-order marginal poverty dominance (FOMD) is defined as D,± 1(k) =
Dt(k),  with at least one strict inequality prevailing where t refers to either a particular time
period (i.e., year, month), or different groups (i.e., households with the elderly versus
households with preschoolers).
11The marginal contribution of  food stamps to poverty reduction can be  evaluated by
estimating the difference in the areas of the poverty incidence curves with and without
food stamps.  This is illustrated in Figure 2. In this instance, the concept of first order
marginal  dominance (FOMD) captures the  marginal contribution of  food  stamps  to
poverty reduction.  This is represented by the shaded area.
To  determine how effective the FSP has been in reducing poverty for certain groups
(transient poor versus structurally poor; households with preschoolers versus those with
the elderly), the sample of households are divided up according to these categories and
stochastic and marginal stochastic dominance tests performed for each sub-sample. This
also answers the question of whether the FSP reduces poverty better in some categories of
households (and for some years) than others.
12Figure 1: Stochastic Dominance and Food Stamp Program
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13Figure 2:  Marginal Stochastic Dominance and Food Stamp Program
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144  Description of Data
The data used for this study come from the Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC)
for the years  1989 (November) to  1991.  The modules consist of health,  education,
nutritional status, housing, distance to  social services, and participation in government
social programs.  Grosh (1991) provides a detailed description of the JSLC.  The period
1989-1991 was chosen because there was a gradual devaluation of the Jamaican dollar
during this  period ending in the major devaluation of  1991.  In addition, during this
period, there was an increase in the inflation rate and an increase in poverty indicators
(see Table 1).
In estimating FOMD and SOMD, the full sample of households in 1989, 1990, and 1991
were used along with a sub-sample of households that formed a panel across these years.
In order to construct the panel, dwellings were first linked using the procedure outlined in
the document "Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 1989-93: Basic Information" (page
39).  However, the survey design was such that following the same dwelling over time
was not synonymous with following the same household over time. In order to ensure
that this was the case, it was necessary to list the household roster (for the age, sex and
individual identification variables) and perfonn a manual check of individuals to ensure
consistency. This led to the elimination of some households. The final panel consisted of
986 households.  Summary statistics for expenditure and food stamp transfers are listed in
Table 4.
15Table 4: Summary of Expenditures and Food stamp transfers, 1989-91
1989  1990  1991
Variable  Panel  Full  Panel  Full  Panel  Full
(Averages and Standard  Sample  Sample  Sample  Sample  Sample  Sample
Deviations)
Real per capita  food stamp
transfer  61.01  53.05  20.87  20.38  80.46  73.68
Standard Deviation  169.14  182.08  94.94  105.59  275.61  287.62
Real per capita expenditure  13121.11  15657.41  11480.82  13255.80  10986.79  13560.53
Standard Deviation  14346.13  17169.30  12248.52  14712.78  10683.61  20071.55
Average household size  4.39  4.07  4.26  3.97  4.21  3.93
Standard  Deviation  2.81  2.83  2.72  2.68  2.74  2.66
Number  of Observations  986  3836  986  1821  986  1804
Note:  Estimates  are  weighted  to represent  the  sample  population.  All  values  in 1991  dollars.
5.  Post-transfer estimates of poverty
Table 4 presents the level of expenditure and food stamp transfers for the whole sample
and the panel sample.  Average per capita expenditures are consistently lower for the
panel dataset compared to the full sample across all years.  In addition, average household
size is slightly lower for the panel and food stamp transfers slightly larger for the panel.
This suggests that the panel sample contains a slightly higher proportion of the poor than
does the full sample.  This is supported by a comparison of poverty measures' between
the panel and full sample across all years for the poor (Table 5), and for the ultrapoor
(Table 6).
5The  poverty  lines chosen  were respectively  the third decile  (with mean  per capita  expenditure  of J$6198
in 1991  dollars);  and for the ultra-poor,  the first quintile  (with mean  per capita expenditure  of J$3657 in
1991  dollars). These figures  contrast  with  the poverty  line employed  in Louat, Grosh,  and van der Gaag
(1993)  and estimated  in Gordon  (1989)  of roughly  J$3000  in 1989  (or J$5,527  in 1991  dollars). Andersen
(1993)  estimates  an updated  poverty  line of J$6544.10  in 1991.
16Table 5:  Comparison of Poverty Measures
(between Full Sample and Panel Sample)
1989  1990  1991
Poverty Measure  Panel  Full  Panel  Full  Panel  Full
(as percent of all individuals)  Sample  Sample  Sample  Sample  Sample  Sample
Headcount  29.3  24  34.2  29  34.6  29
Poverty Gap  10.1  7.9  10.7  9.3  12.2  9.9
Mean Food Expenditure Share  40.1  38.9  48.3  46.8  44.7  43.4
Mean Expenditure  13579  16610  12038  14240  11233  14388
Number of Households  986  3813  986  1821  986  1864
Note: The  poverty  line  used is the  third  decile  of 1989  per capita  expenditure  (which  is equivalent  to
J$6198  in 1991  dollars). Estimates  are weighted  to represent  the population.
Table 6: Comparison of Poverty Measures for the Ultra-Poor
(Full and Panel Sample)
1989  1990  1991
Poverty Measures  Panel  Full  Panel  Full  Panel  Full
(as a percent of all poor)  Sample  Sample  Sample  Sample  Sample  Sample
Headcount  38.9  36  32.4  32  39.6  36
Poverty Gap  10.3  9.6  8.3  7.9  11.2  9.9
Mean Food Expenditure Share  46.7  47.7  54.4  54.4  51.1  50.7
Mean Per Capita Expenditure  4062  4115  4264  4233  4024  4094
Number of Households  305  954  353  573  356  552
Note: The ultra-poverty  line  used is the first  quintile  of 1989  per capita  expenditure  (which  is equivalent
to J$3657  in 1991  dollars).  Estimates  are weighted  to represent  the population.
Table 7 summarizes the dynamic aspects of poverty.  The panel sample is divided into
three groups 6:  those households that moved into and out of poverty (transient poor),
those that remained in poverty throughout 1989-1991 (structural poor), and a sample of
all poor households (structural and transient poor).  The poverty lines of J$3657 and
J$6198 are used to determine respectively the estimates of poverty over the three years in
6 The potential  effect  of measuring  error  was examined  by first  categorizing  households  according  to a
relative  poverty  line  based  on predicted  consumption  outcomes.  Categorization  of households  into
poverty  categories  based  on predicted  consumption  yielded  similar  results  to that  based  on actual
consumption.
17the  poor  and  ultrapoor  categories.  As  would  be  expected,  extreme  poverty  is
concentrated among those households that remain poor across all three years.
Table 7: Dynamic Aspects of  Poverty
1989  1990  1991
Transient  Poor
--poor  in some but not all  years
(N=356;  Ultra  Poor  Ultra  Poor  Ultra  Poor
mean  per k expenditure=7627)  Poor  Poor  Poor
Headcount  7.8  38.3  11  53.8  13.9  52.2
Poverty  Gap  1.5  9.6  2.4  13.4  3.7  15
Mean  Food  Expenditure  Share  47.6  43.1  56.2  52.2  51.7  47.8
1989  1990  1991
Structural  Poor
--poor in all three  years
(N=164,  Ultra  Poor  Ultra  Poor  Ultra  Poor
mean  per k expenditure  =3628)  Poor  Poor  Poor
Headcount  55  99.4  47  100  55  100
Poverty  Gap  16  42.7  13  38.7  16  43
Mean  Food  Expenditure  Share  47.3  48.6  56.4  56.8  53.2  53.1
1989  1990  1991
Structural  and Transient  Poor
--poor in any year
(N=520;  Ultra  Poor  Ultra  Poor  Ultra  Poor
mean  per k expenditure  =6394)  Poor  Poor  Poor
Headcount  22.3  57  22  68  26.8  67
Poverty  Gap  5.9  19.8  5.7  21  7.4  24
Mean Food  Expenditure  Share  47.5  44.8  53.5  56.3  49.4  51.9
Note:  The ultra-poverty line used is the first quintile of 1989 precept expenditure. Estimates are weighted to
represent the population and show the percent of the poor who fall below the ultra-poverty line of
J$3657 in 1991 dollars.
6  Estimation of Pre-transfer expenditures
In order to determine the pre-transfer level of expenditure, it is necessary to determine by
how much household expenditures would decline if food stamp income were eliminated
for  those  households  currently receiving these transfers.  This  involved  specifying a
variant of equation (1) to estimate the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) from food
18stamp transfers.  In estimating the MPC, the panel data (986 households over 1989-1991)
was exploited. Following Ravallion, van de Walle and Gautam, (1995) the first difference
of  consumption was  regressed  on  the  first  difference of  FSP  and  other household
characteristics between 1991 and 1989. This was used to estimate an 'average' MPC for
the sample.
Three regressions representing three definitions of household expenditure were estimated
(see Table 7).  With few exceptions (month of interview, dummy variables to capture the
quality of housing), all other variables are first differences. The regressions also include
variables for household structure (i.e. household composition and education of household
head).  Variables to capture quality of housing were included in the regression to capture
household  income  effects. Aside  from  variables  that  captured housing  quality  and
household  structure,  additional  variables  that  influence  program  access  were  also
included in  the regressions - i.e. dummy for the presence of pregnant or lactating
women, dummy variable for the presence of a person receiving food stamps because they
ar disabled. However, a proxy variable that indicated whether there were handicapped
individuals receiving Poor Relief transfers in a household was included in the regressions.
This variable was found to be significant, but did not alter the estimate of the marginal
propensity to consume out of food stamp transfers.
Table 7 summarizes the regression results.  The results yield coefficients of .12 and .11
for  the  impact  of  food  stamp  transfers  on  expenditures-depending  on  whether
expenditures  exclude  or  include  non-consumption  expenditure on  insurance,  taxes,
transfers, interest, and depreciation assets.  There are several potential explanations for
19the small magnitude of the MPC.  It is possible that households are saving part of the
transfers, however it is implausible that this alone explains the magnitude of the MPC.
There might be some reduction in the MPC if households sold part of their reciepts of
FSP.  However, the more plausible explanation is that households are consuming more
leisure.  Alderman and Sahn found this to be the case for their study of the effect of food
stamp transfers on labor supply in Sri Lanka.
The change in food stamp transfers between 1989 and  1991 significantly explains the
change in total expenditures over the same period. However, this effect is not significant
for food expenditures.  This suggests that because food stamps are easily fungible with
cash, the impact of food stamps is to be found mainly on non-food consumption.
20Table 7: Consumption Effects of Food Stamps
Dependent  Variables
Expenditure  Expenditure
(Excluding  Non-  (Including  Non-
Independent  Variables  Consumption)LI  Consumption)  -k  Food Expenditure
Parameter  T-ratio  Parameter  T-ratio  Parameter  T-ratio
Intercept  0.574  1.13  0.844  1.98  -0.101  -0.25
Food Stamp  0.115  2.39  0.108  2.67  0.042  1.09
Change in Household  0.104  0.65  0.092  0.68  0.207  1.60
Structure
Secondary Education  -0.029  -0.75  -0.017  -0.51  0.082  2.63
Post-Secondary Educ.  0.042  0.56  0.031  0.49  0.004  0.07
No. of Children:
less than 4 yrs.  0.006  0.33  0.008  0.51  0.02  1.27
4 - less than 9 yrs.  0.047  2.05  0.027  1.39  0.045  2.44
9- less than 14 yrs.  0.013  0.65  0.009  0.53  -0.001  -0.06
14- less than 19 yrs.  0.124  5.97  0.099  5.69  0.080  4.80
No. of Adults:
19 - less than 25 yrs.  0.095  4.79  0.079  4.77  0.077  4.79
255-lessthan30yrs  0.123  4.05  0.119  4.68  0.103  4.23
30 - less than 45 yrs.  0.096  3.39  0.091  3.83  0.072  3.16
45 - less than 55 yrs.  0.138  4.18  0.144  5.19  0.184  6.92
55 or older  0.005  0.18  0.025  0.97  0.072  2.86
Stone/brick/concr. Wall  0.202  0.86  0.054  0.27  -0.116  -0.61
Block Wall  -0.177  -0.81  -0.194  -1.05  -0.133  -0.75
Other (not wood) Wall  -0.415  -1.16  -0.766  -2.54  0.166  0.57
Metal Roof  -0.427  -1.49  -0.746  -3.11  0.181  0.79
Concrete floor  -0.353  -0.814  -0.067  -0.18  -0.035  -0.10
Wood floor  -0.361  -0.820  -0.081  -0.22  -0.154  -0.44
Tile/marble floor  0.275  0.618  0.475  1.27  0.207  0.58
Toilet with sewer  -0.472  -2.08  -0.182  -0.95  -0.067  -0.36
Toilet without sewer  -0.542  -2.95  -0.085  -0.55  0.003  0.24
Rural  0.393  7.25  0.385  8.47  0.364  8.35
Pregnant or Lactating  0.129  0.22  0.046  0.25  0.306  1.76
FemaleHeadedHH  0.106  0.05  0.124  3.28  0.157  4.33
Handicapped  1.886  3.29  1.636  3.41  0.463  1.01
Month of interview in 89  0.249  1.75  0.192  1.61  0.240  2.09
Month of interview in 90  -0.095  -0.43  -0.042  -0.22  0.306  1.70
Month of interview in 91  -0.349  -1.82  -0.186  -1.15  -0.214  -1.38
Adjusted R-Square  0.31  0.35  0.37
F-Statistic  15.9  19.0  20.2
Number of Observations  967  967
1/  Non-consumption expenditure refers to  expenditure on  taxes, insurance, transfers, depreciation of  assets. The  change in
household structure attempts to capture whether there has been a significant change in household structure (lifecycle).  It
is a dummy variable equal to  I  if the change in the age of the household head between 1989 and 1991 exceeds  2.  All
variables, except the month of interview,  and the  dummy for wood material for walls  in  1989 (Wall  1989) are first
differences.
217  The Impact of the FSP on Household Poverty
In order to examine the impact of the FSP on poverty, the data samples (for the years
1989 to  1991) were divided into household groups according to  the age of  children
present in the household.  This categorization was chosen because the eligibility criteria
of the FSP is based on household composition that is closely tied to the presence of
young children within the household. Households were also differentiated according to
whether they moved into and out of poverty (transient poor) or whether they remained in
poverty  (structural  poor)  throughout the  period  1989-1991. This  categorization  of
structural versus transient poverty was used to examine the  effect of the FSP on the
dynamic aspects of poverty.  The following three questions were examined regarding the
impact of the FSP on the poverty headcount and gap:
i)  How effective was the FSP in reducing poverty within each year (1989-1991)?
ii) Was the FSP more effective in some years relative to others?
iii) Was the FSP more effective in reducing poverty measures for certain vulnerable
groups compared to others?
How Effective were Food Stamps in Reducing Poverty, 1989-1991? The results of first
and second order dominance tests are summarized in Table 9.  First order dominance tests
show that in 1989 pre-FSP and post-FSP expenditure cannot be ranked for any type of
household.  In  1990 however, post-FSP dominates pre-FSP  for all households except
those households with children aged 0 to 5, and households that have elderly members.
22In these households, post- and pre-FSP cannot be ranked.  Similarly, in 1991, post-FSP
dominates pre-FSP expenditure for all households, except those households that have no
children  under  14 years  of age.  Thus,  FSP was less  effective in  reducing poverty
headcount for households with preschoolers or the elderly in  1990, and households that
had no children in 1991.
23Table  9:  Dominance Tests of Expenditure (with and without FSP) by Household
Structure I
Household  Category  Dominance  Tests
First Order Dominance
Households with:  1989  1990  1991
No children between 0-14 years  X  D  X
Children 0-5 years  X  X  D
Children 5-10 years  X  D  D
Children 10-14 years  X  D  D
The Elderly  X  X  D
All Households  X  D  D
Second Order Dominance
Households with:
No children between 0-14 years  X  D  D
Children 0-5 years  D  D  D
Children 5-10 years  D  D  D
Children 10-14 years  X  D  D
The Elderly  D  D  D
All Households  X  D  D
!1X denotes that pre- and post-FSP expenditure cannot be ranked. D denotes that post-FSP dominates
pre-FSP transfer. The elderly include men over 65 and women over 60.
24In  the  case  of  second  order  dominance, post-FSP  expenditure  dominates  pre-FSP
expenditure in 1989 for households with children between the ages of 0 and 10 years, and
also for households with the elderly. For all other household types in 1989 pre- and post-
FSP expenditure cannot be ranked. Post-FSP expenditure dominates pre-FSP expenditure
for all households during the years 1990 and 1991.  Thus, FSP was most effective in
reducing the poverty gap during the years 1990 and 1991 for all households.  In 1989, it
was effective only for households with young children.  In summary, the poverty gap in
Jamaica would have been significantly higher without the FSP, though it would have
made little difference to the incidence of poverty.  In order to assess the sensitivity of
these results, marginal dominance tests were conducted on food stamp transfers both with
and without behavioral assumptions. The results are summarized in Table 10.
As Table  10 shows, in  1989, there is no large difference in expenditure on food stamp
levels across the various behavioral assumptions regarding food stamp income.  In 1990,
when food stamp transfers were at their lowest, there is also no significant difference
across the various behavioral assumptions. However, in 1991, food stamp transfers are at
their highest levels. (This is after the restructuring of the system and discussed further in
the next section).
Incorporating behavioral responses leads to  an increase in  1991 consumption, for the
poorest groups of 1 percent, at the margin.  By contrast, when behavioral responses are
ignored, expenditures at the margin are 9 percent higher than would be the case without
FSP.  These results are consistent with other studies which have found that incorporating
25behavioral responses into incidence analysis significantly alters the poverty impact of  the
program.
For  example,  Van  de  Walle,  Ravallion  and  Gautam  also  find  that  incorporating
behavioral  responses  leads  to  lower  poverty  impact  of  cash  transfers  in  Hungary
(compared to an assumption of no behavioral response in consumption). Similarly, Sahn
and Aldennan found that for Sri Lanka, explicitly incorporating labor supply into their
analysis of the poverty impact of the FSP, led to a large and significant reduction in work
effort.
Table  10: Percent  Change  in Household  Consumption  due to Food Stamp  Transfers
Without  Behavioral  Response With Behavioral  Response
Year  Poorest  Poor  Close  to  Poorest  Poor Close  to
Poverty  Line  Poverty  Line
1989  6.0  1.5  2.5  0.8
1990  2.2  0.6  1.0  0.3
1991  9.2  2.0  3.0  1.0
Note: Poorest  groups  refers  to those earning  less  than half  of income  at the  poverty  line. Poor  close
to the poverty  line  refer  to groups  earning  income  within  the range  of 25%  above  or below  the poverty  line.
Source: Table  11.
26Table 11: First Order Marginal Dominance of Food Stamp Transfers for the Poor by Various Behavioral Assumptions, 1989-1991
Alternative Poverty  1989  1990  1991  1989-  1989  1990-
Lines  90  -91  91
(as multiples of the  Before-FS  After-FS  Food  Before-FS  After-FS  Food  Before-FS  After-FS  Food  T-tests  for food stamp
poverty lineJ$6198)  Expenditure  Expenditure  Stamps  Expenditure  Expenditure  Stamps  Expenditure  Expenditure  Stamps  means
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
Food Stamps
Assumed Exogenous
0.50  2345  2362  102  2345  2351  35  2362  2382  126  3.66  -1.11  -4.51
0.75  3896  3913  104  3883  3889  36  3904  3926  137  4.33  -1.39  -4.97
1.00  5430  5446  92  5442  5446  25  5350  5368  105  4.18  -0.58  -4.49
1.25  6978  6989  70  6950  6956  33  6964  6981  103  2.50  -1.15  -1.98
1.50  8480  8488  53  8473  8477  23  8462  8477  92  2.25  -1.40  -1.95
No Behavioral  Before-FS  After-FS  Food  Before-FS  After-FS  Food  Before-FS  After-FS  Food  T-tests for food stamp
Assumptions  Expenditure  Expenditure  Stamps  Expenditure  Expenditure  Stamps  Expenditure  Expenditure  Stamps  means
0.50  2284  2421  137  2344  2396  52  2299  2511  212  3.70  -1.89  -3.31
0.75  3876  3971  102  3885  3914  29  3894  4062  168  4.92  -2.09  -4.06
1.00  5417  5505  88  5441  5474  33  5342  5433  90  3.98  -0.09  -2.85
1.25  6971  7033  62  6955  6989  34  6953  7031  79  2.09  -0.98  -2.25
1.50  8480  8543  63  8470  8477  8  8461  8497  35  3.49  1.62  -2.47
27Variable impacts on different vulnerable groups. The discussion in the previous sections
outlined the overall pattern of poverty in Jamaica during 1989-91 with and without the
FSP.  This section will address how effective food stamps transfers were in reducing
poverty for various household types during this period.  Figures 3 to 6 summarize the
results  of  first and  second order  marginal dominance tests  (FOMD, SOMD) for the
impact of food stamps for households below, at, and above the poverty line of J$6 198 (set
at I in the Figures) in 1991 dollars. The results indicate that the impact of food stamps on
poverty is sensitive to the poverty line chosen.
First, the per capita mean and cumulative mean food stamp transfers were significantly
lower in 1990 than in 1989 and 1991 (see also Table 12). It is not clear why there is such
a  large difference in per capita FSP transfers to  households between 1990 and  1989,
1991.  One explanation may be that the level of need declined in  1990 and increased
thereafter.  However, poverty estimates summarized in Table  1, along with stochastic
dominance tests of expenditure over these years, do not support this explanation. A more
plausible explanation is that the major reorganization of the FSP in  1990 reduced the
access of households to benefits.  This reorganization reduced the administrative ceiling
of 400,000 beneficiaries to  300,000:  150,000 children under  five,  15,000 pregnant
women,  15,000 lactating mothers, accounting for 60 percent  of the lower  total; and
120,000 or 40  percent were  those in  income related categories.  A new beneficiary
category was also introduced to cover individuals in households of two or more persons
earning total income of $7,200 annually and single member households earning $3,000.
28Figures 5 and 6 show that below the poverty line of J$6198 (represented by the number 1
along the horizontal axis), households with young children faired better in  1991 with
respect to the impact of the FSP on headcount and poverty gap measures of poverty.
Relatively speaking, the reorganization seems to have benefited those households with
young children more than those households without young children.
In terms of the dynamic aspects of poverty, Figures 3 and 4 show that those exposed to
prolonged periods of poverty faired better with the FSP in 1991 than in the previous two
years.  For  the  transient poor,  the  FSP  was most  effective in  reducing the  poverty
headcount in  1989. The data in these years suggest that the reorganization of the FSP
benefited those suffering from prolonged periods of poverty relatively more compared to
the transient poor.
Which Vulnerable Groups Benefited most  from the FSP? In order to determine for which
groups the FSP was most effective in reducing their poverty, FOMD, and SOMD tests of
per capita FSP transfers were performed. Figures 3 to 6 present graphical representations
of these curves.  Figures 3 and 4 compare the effects of the FSP on poverty measures for
the structural and transient poor, from  1989 to  1991.  As Figure 3 shows, before the
reorganization, FSP transfers were more effective in reducing the headcount measure for
the transient poor.  However, after the reorganization FSP transfers were more effective
in reducing poverty measures for the structural poor.  In terms of SOMD, or the poverty
gap, before the reorganization FSP was most effective in reducing the poverty gap for the
transient poor.  During the 1990 reorganization, the structural poor benefited more from
reductions  in  the  poverty  gap  due  to  FSP  transfers.  However,  a  year  after  the
29reorganization, it is not  clear which group benefited most  from FSP transfers - the
structural or the transient poor.
Figures 5 and 6 compare the relative impact of the FSP for households differentiated
according to the presence of young children in the household.  The figures show that
those households with no young children benefited most from the FSP transfers in terms
of reduction in the headcount measure of poverty.
8  Conclusions
This paper has examined the impact of the food stamp program on measures of poverty
during the devaluation of the Jamaican dollar in the early 1  990s. The broad finding of the
paper is that in the absence of FSP, the poverty gap in Jamaica would have been much
higher.  This is particularly the case for the years 1990 and 1991.  For the country as a
whole,  the  absence  of  the  FSP  would  not  have  affected the  incidence  of  poverty
significantly.  However, without the FSP, particular groups among the poor would have
faired worse.  In particular, households with the elderly benefited most. Households with
young  children  benefited  relatively  more  (compared  to  households  without  young
children), in terms of the contribution of the FSP to a reduction in the poverty headcount
and gap for these groups. Also, the program appears to have had a greater impact on the
poverty headcount and gap of extremely poor households compared to those households
that  moved  into  and  out  of  poverty  (the  transient  poor).  Moreover,  explicitly
incorporating  behavioral  responses  reduces  the  contribution  of  FSP  to  household
consumption/poverty, but the poorest have benefited the most from the program even
30after accounting for behavioral responses.  Nevertheless, the program contributed more
toward a reduction in poverty than in smoothing consumption.
31Figure 3:  Comparison  of Structural  and Transient  Poor, FOMD
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33Figure  5:  First  Order  Marginal  Dominance  Comparison  by  Household
Composition
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